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The ‘going public’ of religious actors is taking central stage both in religious studies and
political philosophy. But this ‘going public’ of religious actors is controversial. The debate
revolves around the question of whether religious actors must frame their religious convictions
in terms of secular reasons or whether they should be allowed to introduce religiously
grounded beliefs into public political argument without constraints. Despite vigorous and
ongoing debate, there is little systematic and empirical research on this question. This article
focuses on the public statements of religious actors in the context of Swiss direct democratic
votes on abortion and immigration. Our empirical findings reveal an interesting gap: while
many political philosophers and religious thinkers have moved to a position where religious
actors can – and even should – openly employ religious arguments, the practice of religious
actors in Switzerland is different. The larger denominations of Catholics and Protestants
especially have a tendency to use a great amount of secular vocabulary. In addition, our
findings also reveal that the use of religious or secular reasons varies considerably according to
different issues, different media types (religious vs. secular press), different religious traditions,
different alliance structures, and different media genres, while there is no clear time trend.
Keywords: religion; political philosophy; argumentation
Introduction
The ‘going public’ of religious actors is taking central stage both in religious
studies and political philosophy. As Casanova (1994) has observed, there is a
‘deprivatisation’ of religion in Western societies, with religious actors going public
and becoming normal civic actors advocating their cause. But this ‘going public’
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among religious actors is controversial. The debate in political philosophy revolves
around the question of whether religious actors must frame their religious convictions
in terms of secular reason, the classical liberal view, or whether they should be allowed
to introduce religiously grounded beliefs into public political argument without any
constraints, the communitarian and post-classical liberal view (see Rawls, 1993;
Weithman, 1997, 2002; Wolterstorff, 1997a, b; Audi, 2000; Habermas, 2006;
Boettcher and Harmon, 2009; McGraw, 2010). In recent years, the direction of the
post-classical liberal and communitarian view has shifted towards advocating a pol-
itics of non-restriction and even promotion of religious reasons in the public sphere.
Despite vigorous and ongoing debate, systematic and empirical research on this
question has lagged behind. Our article seeks to change this. We focus on public
statements of religious actors in the context of Swiss direct democratic votes on
abortion and immigration. Our article has a dual focus: on the one hand, we analyse
how often religious actors refer to religious or secular reasons when making public
statements in the public sphere (in selected daily newspapers as well as in the religious
press). This enables us to test whether a classical liberal frame prevails, with religious
actors predominantly using secular reasons in public debate, or whether a post-clas-
sical liberal and communitarian frame prevails, with religious actors predominantly
using religious reasons. On the other hand, we want to go beyond a simple inventory
and also study the antecedents driving the public use of religious vs. secular reasons
among religious actors. We focus on five factors that may affect the argumentative
patterns of religious actors in the public sphere: different issues (abortion vs. immi-
gration), different communication channels (religious vs. secular press and different
media genres such as interviews or letters to the editor), different religious groups
(with different theological traditions), different actors within religious groups (internal
diversity of religious denominations), and different times (changes in argumentative
patterns between the 1970s and 2000s). We intend to provide a more nuanced
understanding of how religious actors argue in the public sphere. In order to distin-
guish between religious and secular arguments, we created an indicator that measures
whether a statement contains an explicit ‘religious marker’ such as a reference to God,
Jesus, or the Bible. In addition, we also created an indicator that measures the degree
of explicit religiosity. We analysed about 800 public statements of religious actors in
15 direct democratic votes in Switzerland in the period from 1970 to 2007.
Our empirical results reveal an interesting gap: while many political philosophers
and religious thinkers have moved to a post-classical liberal position where religious
actors can – and even should – openly employ religious arguments, the practice of
religious actors in Switzerland is different. Catholics and Protestants use a large
amount of secular arguments in direct democratic votes, a trend that has even
slightly accelerated in the 2000s. We think that this gap between philosophical
aspirations and real-world practice must spur reflection both in the camp of
philosophers and in the camp of religious actors (and religious campaigners). Both
camps may need to re-think how the argumentation modes of religious actors should
look – and how they can look under the constraints of real-world politics.
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section ‘The ‘‘going
public’’ of religious group’ gives more background on the debate between classic
liberals vs. post-classic liberals and communitarians regarding the proper use of
religious and secular reasons in the public sphere. Section ‘Empirical translations’
translates these theoretical ideas into empirical research and describes our theo-
retical approach regarding the differential use of religious and secular reasons
among religious actors. Section ‘Empirical analysis’ operationalizes the dependent
variable (religious vs. secular reasons) and the predictor variables, discusses the
statistical method, and presents the empirical findings. Section ‘Conclusion’
concludes and discusses the normative and practical implications of our findings.
The ‘going public’ of religious groups
Contemporary Western societies confront two parallel trends in religion. On the
one hand, there is a trend towards secularization in the Western world (with the
exception of the United States; see e.g. Bruce, 2002; Dobbelaere, 2002; Pollack,
2003, 2009). Some authors also emphasize religious individualization and
privatization (see Luckmann, 1967; Davie, 1994, 2000; Gabriel, 1996; Hervieu-
Le´ger, 1999). Religion retreats to the private sphere, leading to a diffuse and
partly non-Christian religiosity. On the other hand, there is a parallel trend of a
religious ‘recurrence’. Jose´ Casanova (1994) depicts this as the ‘de-privatization’
of religion, coupled with the ‘going public’ of established religious communities.
Although religious sociologists have been taken aback by the self-confidence of
religious actors in the public sphere, religious actors going public has also sparked
a controversial debate in political philosophy [for a recent overview, see the
special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism (2009: Vol. 35, Nos 1–2)]. The
contentious point is whether and how religious communities should bring their
religious convictions into the public sphere. The starting point of the debate is
John Rawls’s (1993) conception of political liberalism with its two core principles
of ‘public reason’ and ‘duty of civility’. According to Rawls, the two principles
require that democratic citizens owe each other justifications based on reasons
that everyone can understand and reasonably accept. This implies a translation
proviso for religious convictions. In Rawls’s words: ‘The first is that reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced in public
political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political
reasons – and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines – are presented
that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to
support’ (Rawls, 1993: 217). As Lafont (2007: 241) points out, there is some
ambiguity in Rawls’s writings about the exact status of comprehensive doctrines
and political reasons in the public sphere. Rawls seems to be open to using reasons
related to comprehensive doctrines in the public sphere, especially when it comes
to argumentations by citizens. But, as Lafont (2007: 242) notes, even in his latest
discussions of the issue, Rawls eventually gives priority to the principle of public
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reason: ‘when a stand-off occurs, citizens simply invoke grounding reasons of
their comprehensive views, the principle of reciprocity is violated’. A number of
other prominent liberal philosophers have aired similar thoughts. Robert Audi
(2000) for instance, argues that religious reasons in the public sphere are legit-
imate only if they combine with convincing secular reasons: ‘one has a prima facie
obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy unless one has, and
is willing to offer, adequate secular reasons for this advocacy or support’ (p. 86).1
According to McGraw (2010), Audi’s stress on secular reasons has a strong
epistemological dimension as well: secular reasons are deemed more reliable than
religious ones.
Banning religious arguments from the public sphere has met with resistance
from several prominent religious thinkers. As Wolterstorff (1997b: 170) argues,
religious actors should be free to present their religious arguments in public
discussion: ‘[T]he ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy imposes no restric-
tions on the reasons people offer in their discussion of political issues in the public
square’. Similarly, Weithman (2002: 121) holds: ‘Citizens of a liberal democracy
may offer arguments in public political debate which depend upon reasons drawn
from their comprehensive moral views, including their religious views, without
making them good by appeal to other arguments’. If they find majorities for their
religious arguments, this must be considered democratic. Finally, McGraw (2010)
argues that modern democracies do best when they ‘foster open toleration and
robust engagement of all forms of faith and non-faith that can test and contest
each others’ policies’.
According to advocates of no restriction, there are several reasons why religious
arguments should be given unconstrained access to public discourse. First, reli-
gious arguments may not be more divisive than secular arguments. According to
Lawrence Solum (1990: 1083), ‘[c]onditions in modern democracies may be so far
from the conditions that gave rise to the religious wars of the sixteenth century
that we no longer need to worry about religious divisiveness as a source of sub-
stantial social conflict’. Second, there is no reason to believe that religious reasons
cannot contribute to a reasonable public discourse. For Stephen Carter (1993), the
opposite is actually true: ‘our political culture cannot be truly deliberative unless
we let ourselves be tested by religiously grounded moral beliefs’ (p. 240). Third,
religion still plays an influential role in the life of many citizens see Perry (2001).
Thus, religious arguments may exert a persuasive force for a significant number of
citizens in a democracy. Fourth, the role of (abstract) philosophical arguments in
public discourse is questionable. As Wolterstorff (1997a, b: 177) puts it: ‘What
has been rushed in to fill the void is not noble discussions about principles of
justice which have been extracted in Rawlsian fashion from the consensus populi.
1 Notice that Audi accepts that certain religious convictions cannot be translated into secular
language. However, such convictions remain partial and do not satisfy political decisions that entail
universal reach (Audi, 2000: 86–100).
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For nobody cares about principles of justice thus obtained. What has been rushed
in to fill the void is mainly considerations of economic self-interest, of privatism,
and of nationalism’. Fifth, religion can provide public conversation with much
needed resources. It can point to elements of the secular worldview, which have
undisclosed and unrecognized metaphysical backgrounds; moreover, religious
actors may tap into important themes of religiously based social criticism (Perry,
2001). Sixth, McGraw (2010) argues that secular reasons ‘need not to be more
reliable than religious ones, especially when we are dealing with moral questions
as opposed to strictly scientific or empirical ones’ (p. 101). What count as superior
secular reasons are often culturally bounded premises that we find plausible and
persuasive simply because we have been socialized in that particular culture
(McGraw, 2010). In this regard, McGraw (2010: 162) also argues that it is dif-
ficult to uphold the Rawlsian ‘duty of civility’ since what citizens exactly under-
stand by the notion of civility will remain controversial. Finally, religious
institutions fulfil crucial functions for society. With an eye on the United States,
Coleman (2001) argues that religious institutions generate more social capital
than any other institution. Consequently, ‘[e]ven a ‘secularist’y might plausibly
desire a more public role of churches in our civic society, precisely because of
the ‘secular’ spin-off churches provide: greater volunteering; greater contributions
to public civic organisations and charities; greater voting behavior’ (Coleman,
2001: 284–285).
In a recent essay, Ju¨rgen Habermas (2006) has proposed a ‘friendly amendment’
to a politics of restriction. Like other commentators, Habermas points out that
Rawls’s conception of public reason is too restrictive. In his view, the liberal
state cannot expect that all citizens justify their positions independent of their
religious convictions. In particular, since the liberal state institutionally privileges
secular reasons the translation proviso puts an asymmetric burden on religious
citizens and religious actors. At the same time, Rawls’s translation proviso
can force religious citizens to misrepresent their cause: by publicly stating reasons
that do not conform to their true religious convictions. In order to preserve
the integrity of the religious existence, Habermas allows – and even calls on –
religious citizens to use religious vocabulary reasons instead of translating their
claims into a philosophical pseudo-language. Finally, Habermas thinks that
secular citizens can also learn from religious convictions if the latter contain
normative claims and truths that also relate to the secular sphere. Religion can act
as a source of inspiration for secular philosophy, especially within the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. Moreover, religion can convey moral insights in a way that
philosophy cannot. This reiterates Wolterstorff’s (1997a, b) claim that religious
reasoning is frequently more accessible to citizens than the deployment of
(abstract) philosophical principles.
However, Habermas’ ‘friendly amendment’ has clear limits. Habermas strongly
opposes proposals that promote using religious arguments in processes of
democratic legislation and decision-making on the grounds that this violates the
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discursive character of such deliberations. As such, it is unclear whether Habermas
would permit the massive use of religious reasons by organized religious
actors (such as the Catholic Church) in campaigns prior to a direct democratic
vote. According to McGraw’s (2010) interpretation of Habermas’ ‘friendly
amendment’, ‘[r]eligion can make claims about the morality or immorality of any
particular law and it can urge political changes to meet its particular moral vision.
But it cannot y seek to flex it muscle politically and coerce others, even if that
‘coercion’ is purely psychological or spiritual’ (p. 122). Direct democratic cam-
paigns are somewhat in-between advocacy and political decision-making. But as
long as advocacy does not entail coercion, Habermas may not be in strict
opposition to the more frequent use of religious reasons in the context of direct
democratic campaigns.
In sum, the current trend in political philosophy clearly goes in direction of
allowing religious reasons in public discourse (with more or less restrictions on
political decision-making). Our overall conclusion drawn from this review of
arguments in favour and against the translation requirement is that the scholarly
debate might be improved were the philosophical models submitted to systematic
and wide-ranging empirical investigations. So far, few scholars have taken an
in-depth look at actual patterns of argumentation among religious actors
(exceptions are Kettell, 2009; Klemp, 2010). We think that matters cannot be
resolved at the level of theoretical stipulation alone, with little recourse to
empirical evidence beyond illustrative anecdotes.
Empirical translations
We will now engage in a systematic analysis of religious and secular arguments in
the context of selected Swiss direct democratic votes. One may wonder why we
focus on a largely secular society such as Switzerland where the topic of religious
vs. secular reasons is not a very salient one [compared with a less secular society
such as the United States (see Norris and Inglehart, 2004) where this topic is
salient and controversial]. First, we think that it may also be interesting to study
this topic under largely secular conditions. In such a context, religious actors
may be confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand, they may have a natural
inclination to present their religious convictions in an unfiltered and authentic
way. This also corresponds to the current trend in political philosophy, which
allows – and even advocates – a stronger use of religious reasons in the public
sphere. On the other hand, they may feel pressured to translate their religious
convictions into secular vocabulary in order to conform to the secular norms of
the society (see McGraw, 2010: 104). Therefore, it will be interesting to explore
how religious actors manage this tension in the context of strong secularity.
Second, direct democratic institutions in Switzerland represent an excellent locus
to study religious argumentation in the public sphere. Direct democratic votes
enable citizens to decide upon specific issues. This, in turn, creates incentives for
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religious groups to ‘go public’ when their interests and beliefs are affected, to try
to influence the voting behaviour of their own members as well as that of the
wider public. Third, Switzerland also involves a great variety of religious groups
and actors, ranging from Catholics, Protestants, Christ-Catholics to Free Churches
(including evangelical groups), Jewish groups, and Muslims. This religious plurality
will not only give us a broad picture of how religious actors argue in the public
sphere, it will also enable us to explore differences in the argumentative modes of
different religious groups. Finally, studying the argumentation modes of religious
actors in Swiss direct democratic votes has two methodological advantages: on the
one hand, direct democratic votes entail highly institutionalized political campaigns
with a clear time frame (start and end of the campaign); on the other hand, since
democratic votes are issue specific, one can study the deployment of religious and
secular reasons in the context of clearly delineated issues. Conversely, if we were to
analyse different issues in the context of elections and election campaigns, we
would confront the methodological problem of much more blurred issue specificity
(since most elections have multi-issue agendas).
A first focus of our study will be to explore whether, and how often, religious
actors refer to religious or secular reasons when making public statements. In this
vein, we evaluate whether religious actors adopt the classical liberal position and
predominantly use secular reasons in the public sphere, or whether a post-classical
liberal and communitarian view prevails in that religious actors predominantly
use religious reasons in the public sphere.
A second focus of our study is the analysis of the antecedents of religious and
secular reasons in the public sphere. In so doing, we go beyond a simple inventory
of different argumentation modes. We seek to better understand the mechanisms
underlying the use of religious vs. secular reasons of religious actors. Of course, if
all religious actors argued in a uniform way in the public sphere (e.g. if religious
actors only used religious reasons), then there would be no need to study the
mechanisms of differential modes of argumentation. But a glimpse at our data
reveals that there is considerable variation to be explored.
We start from the assumption that political discourse is largely strategic. We
expect that religious actors are strategic campaigners in direct democratic votes
and try to influence the voting choices of their members as well as those of the
wider public. This is also in line with the ‘framing’ literature (see Sniderman and
Theriault, 2004: 158; for an excellent overview see Ha¨nggli, 2010). This literature
assumes that by appropriately framing an issue, actors in the public sphere
attempt to construct the meaning of the reality in order to enhance support for
their own point of view. Frames selectively draw attention to certain aspects of the
topic under discussion and ‘promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described’ (Entman, 1993: 52). Strategic framers adapt their framing choices to
specific circumstances and calculate respective costs and benefits. With regard to
religious vs. secular argumentation, we expect that different contexts (such as
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different communication channels; see below) affect whether and how often
religious actors use religious or secular reasons. Besides strategic framing choices,
we also expect that ideological and organizational factors affect the way in which
religious groups argue in the public sphere.
Let us now turn to the concrete contextual, actor-related, and time-specific
factors that help us understand under which conditions religious actors use more
religious or secular vocabulary.
Context: issues
Different issues may affect the way in which religious actors argue. We expect that
topics that touch upon the core values of religious groups (such as abortion and
related questions of life and death) lead to more religious argumentation than
other less value-laden issues (such as immigration). Not only are value-laden
topics highly salient for religious actors, they also strongly affect the self-under-
standing of religious groups as value protectors and value generators in society.
Thus, in the context of highly value-laden topics religious actors will put a strong
prime on their religiosity and their religious traditions, leading to a more frequent
use of religious reasons.
Context: media channels and media genres
Different media channels and media genres may affect the argumentation mode of
religious actors. According to the framing literature, campaigners vary their
framing choices according to whom they address as well as according to whether
the communication channel is mediated or unmediated (see Ha¨nggli, 2010). In
mediated communication channels, campaigners promote messages, which have to
pass selection by journalists. Campaigners must then cater to the needs and values
of journalists. By contrast, unmediated communication channels guarantee a
campaign’s control over the content and form of the message. They allow cam-
paigners to get their ‘ideal’ message to the public unfiltered by media gatekeepers
(see Norris et al., 1999). Thus, we expect differences between religious and secular
media. In the former, religious groups can present their ‘ideal’ message to like-
minded followers, whereas in the latter they have an incentive to abide by the
(secular) norms of journalists as well as the wider public sphere. Moreover, religious
groups (and particularly their leadership organizations; see below) may have an
incentive to explain how the group’s specific positioning on an issue relates to the
basic tenets of the group’s theology to their followers; this is generally accomplished
in the context of internal media. Consequently, we expect religious groups to use
religious reasons more frequently in their internal media than in the general media.
Moreover, the distinction between mediated and unmediated channels also refers to
different media genres. We expect that in less-mediated channels such as political
ads and letters to the editor, religious actors can present their unfiltered – or less
filtered – messages. Conversely, when religious actors present their position using
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mediated channels (e.g. in the context of press releases or in interviews), they need
to abide by the secular values of journalists. Again, we expect religious actors to use
religious reasons more frequently in less-mediated media genres and secular reasons
more frequently in the fully mediated media genres.
Actors: religious traditions
Arguing in the public sphere entails an ideological dimension as well. When going
public, religious actors draw from their own religious traditions. We expect that
different theological and religious traditions matter to how religious groups argue
in the public sphere. In this regard, some religious groups have theological
backgrounds that ease the translation of their religious claims into a secular
vocabulary, whereas other religious groups have theological backgrounds that
hinder such translation efforts. In the Swiss context, the religious groups that
regularly participate in the public discourse are Catholics, Protestants, the Old
Catholic Church, Free Churches,2 and, to a lesser degree, Jewish groups, and
Muslims. First, the Catholic Church has a strong tradition of ‘natural’ theology.
At an ethical level, this traditionally implies a linkage to a natural rights discourse,
leading to an identification of divine and natural law. This identification of divine
and natural law might make it easier for the Catholic Church to translate its
positions and arguments into secular arguments, while simultaneously retaining
its Catholic religiosity (see Schockenhoff, 1996). Conversely, the Protestant
Church makes strong reference to its own religious tradition, which is strongly
geared to using biblical arguments. This might make it more difficult for Pro-
testant groups to translate their positions and arguments into secular arguments.3
With regard to their theological tradition, the Old Catholic Church is somewhere
in between the Catholic and the Protestant Church. Evangelical groups, in turn,
take biblical texts in a literal sense as well as an authority over any political
judgment. This is combined with missionary instruction. Thus, evangelical groups
may have a strong tendency to use religious (biblical) arguments in their public
statements. Jews and Muslims are religious groups that place a strong prime on
their theological traditions, leading them to use religious reasons rather than
2 Contrary to the main churches (the Catholic and Protestant churches), so-called ‘Free Churches’ do
not maintain a special relationship with the state in Switzerland. Free churches comprise a variety of
evangelical and pentecostal churches.
3 We acknowledge that there are theological differences within both the Catholic and the Protestant
churches. Liberal Catholics are very different from traditional Catholics, as are liberal from conservative
Protestants, and these internal differences may also affect the mode of argumentation. Although we take
organizational diversity into account (see section on ‘Internal Diversity’), we do not fully address the issue
of internal theological differences in the Catholic and Protestant churches. The problem is that in a large
quantitative study, it is very difficult to reliably identify liberal or conservative representatives within the
churches. This is compounded by the fact that representatives of liberal and conservative strands appear
as single actors (for which we control in the statistical analysis) rather than as group representatives.
Future research may need to shed light on such theological differences and the respective use of religious
arguments.
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secular reasons in arguments. Finally, we expect less religious argumentation
when different religious groups act together with secular groups. When religious
actors act together with other religious actors, however, it is more difficult to
formulate clear expectations: one strategy to bridge different theological back-
grounds and bring them together in a common organization or statement is to use
a secular frame of argumentation. Conversely, religious groups acting together
may also have an incentive to identify themselves as a religious actor and hence
use religious markers.
Actors: internal diversity
It is misleading to speak of religious groups such as ‘Catholics’ or ‘Protestants’ as
unified religious actors. Rather, we need to take the internal diversity of religious
groups into account. Therefore, we focus on the diverse actors within religious
communities, running from leadership organizations to grassroots organizations
and associations. In this regard, we expect leadership organizations to use more
religious arguments than associations and grassroots organizations. Leadership
organizations have a strong incentive to reinforce and promote the group’s reli-
gious values, whereas associations and grassroots organizations (such as charity
organizations) are much more closely aligned with the secular sphere and will
therefore utilize a more secular vocabulary.
Time
As mentioned before, most Western societies are witnessing a secularization trend.
Thus, society has changed in the past decades, and these societal changes may leave
their imprint on the way in which religious groups argue. As strategic actors in
direct democratic campaigns, religious actors will recognize that in a largely secular
society (such as Switzerland), messages that resonate with the broader public
should be framed in secular rather than purely religious terms. Thus, we expect that
in the course of past decades, religious campaigners in direct democratic votes will
use religious arguments less frequently. To be sure, this expectation – based on the
strategic framing approach – runs counter to the current trend in political philo-
sophy, which advocates a more open use of religious reasons in the public sphere.
Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis focuses on two issues in the context of Swiss direct
democratic votes, namely abortion and immigration. Both issues have strongly
mobilized religious actors. Although abortion touches upon a vital concern for
religious groups, immigration touches upon religious groups’ concerns with
humanity and solidarity.
With regard to abortion debates, we selected all direct democratic votes at the
federal level in the time period from the 1970s to the 2000s: ‘Popular initiative for
114 A N D R E´ B A¨ C H T I G E R E T A L .
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000057
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
abortions during the first term’4 (1977), ‘Federal Law on the Protection of
Pregnancy’5 (1978); ‘Popular Initiative on the Right to Live’6 (1985), and ‘Popular
Initiative for Mother and Child’/‘Federal Law on Abortion’ (2002).7
With regard to immigration, there were a fairly large number of direct demo-
cratic votes at the federal level in the period from 1970 to 2007. In order to keep
the project manageable, we had to make a selection of direct democratic votes.
The criteria for selection were the importance of the vote as well as the different
political constellations surrounding these votes, namely a divide between left- and
right-wing political parties or a divide between radical right movements and all
other political parties. Our goal was to obtain a sample that reflects both the
importance of the vote and the diversity of political constellations before and after
1990. We selected the following direct democratic votes: ‘Popular Initiative
against Immigration (Schwarzenbach-Initiative)’8 (1970), ‘Initiative for a new
immigration policy’9 (1981), ‘Asylum and Immigration Law’10 (1987), ‘Popular
Initiative for the Regulation of Immigration (18% Initiative)’11 (2000), and
‘Federal Law on Foreigners’/‘Asylum Law Revision’12 (2 issues) (2006).
To collect the claims and argumentations of religious groups we used political
claims analysis (PCA). Although PCA was developed in the context of new social
movements, it is ideally suited to capture the claim-making of religious groups
as well. ‘PCA uses newspapers as a systematic source for identifying the claims
of groups (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). It has two distinct strengths (see
Giugni and Passy, 2002): first, it allows us to collect a wide variety of claims in the
public sphere, including established and marginal groups (such as Muslims).
Second, it allows us to analyse the content of claims and arguments in a detailed
fashion and extract religious vs. secular frames (see below). In our study, we
focused on all interventions made by religious actors in the public sphere in a
pre-defined time frame, namely the 3 months prior to a vote as well as 2 weeks
after the vote. The interventions comprise press releases, interviews, letters to the
editor, and political advertisements. With regard to the secular media, we focused
on three Swiss quality newspapers – ‘Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung’, ‘Tagesanzeiger’, and
‘Tribune de Gene`ve’. With regard to the internal press of the religious groups, we
focused on a wide variety of newspapers comprising all religious communities
4 ‘Volksinitiative fu¨r die Fristenlo¨sung’.
5 ‘Bundesgesetz u¨ber den Schutz der Schwangerschaft und die Strafbarkeit des Schwangerschaftsab-
bruchs’.
6 ‘Volksinitiative Recht auf Leben’.
7 ‘Volksinitiative fu¨r Mutter und Kind – fu¨r den Schutz des ungeborenen Kindes und fu¨r die Hilfe
an seine Mutter in Not’ (Initiative fu¨r Mutter und Kind)/Gesetz u¨ber den Schwangerschaftsabbruch
(Fristenlo¨sung).
8 ‘Volksbegehren gegen die U¨berfremdung (Schwarzenbach-Initiative)’.
9 ‘Mitenand-Initiative fu¨r eine neue Ausla¨nderpolitik’.
10 ‘Asyl- und Ausla¨ndergesetz’.
11 ‘Volksinitiative fu¨r eine Regelung der Zuwanderung (18% Initiative)’.
12 ‘Bundesgesetz u¨ber die Ausla¨nderinnen und Ausla¨nder (AuG)/A¨nderung des Asylgesetzes’.
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(Catholics, Protestants, Christ-Catholics, Free Churches, Jews, and Muslims). In
addition, we also conducted a wide-ranging internet search and archival research
to complement our data set.
Measuring explicit religiosity
Measuring religious reasons is no easy task. Audi (2000) argues that there are two
criteria for capturing the essence of secular and religious reasons. First, a secular
reason is ‘roughly one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie
justificatory element, does not evidentially depend on the existence of God (or on
denying it) or on theological considerations, or on the pronouncement of a person
or institution qua religious authority’ (p. 89). Second, and less importantly, a
secular reason must be complemented by a secular motivation, that is, religious
actors must be sincere or truthful when they refer to secular reasons.
Although Audi’s first criterion provides a useful way of empirically distin-
guishing between religious and secular reasons (see below), we think that in the
context of PCA it is very difficult to conceive of religiosity in motivational terms
as well. First, to judge whether actors have a religious or secular motivation is to
make a judgment about a person’s true preferences vs. their stated preferences.
This is exceedingly difficult, since true preferences are not directly observable. The
speculative nature of such a judgment is bound to introduce large amounts of
(possibly systematic) measurement error. Second, as mentioned before, arguing in
the public sphere and in the context of direct democratic votes creates strong
incentives for strategic arguing (also for religious actors). The strategic nature of
the context reinforces the problem of making a clear-cut empirical distinction
between strategic and true preferences.
Thus, in order to operationalize explicit religiosity we used Audi’s first criterion
only, dropping his second. In concrete terms, we focused on ‘religious markers’,
which secular persons (or atheists) would immediately recognize as religious
argumentation. Religious markers involve words like ‘Jesus’, ‘God’, ‘Bible’, Bible
quotes (such as the ‘Ten Commandments’), and references to religious authorities.
We created a first indicator of explicit religiosity to measure whether a text contains
a religious marker (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). This is based on the assumption
that a single religious marker creates a religious framing for the whole text. Note,
further, that we only coded instances where a religious argument with a ‘positive’
connotation to religiosity was offered. Statements such as ‘some people rely heavily
on what the Bible commands, and that’s wrong’ were not coded under this rubric.13
However, this operationalization does not take into account the fact that a
statement might be framed in a more or less religious fashion. To capture this, we
created an additional indicator measuring the degree of explicit religiosity,
ranging from 1 (no religiosity) to 5 (high religiosity). A value of 1 indicates ‘no
13 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the clarification and the example.
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religiosity’ (and represents the value of 0 of our first indicator of explicit reli-
giosity; see above14); a value of 2 indicates ‘low religiosity’; a value of 3 indicates
‘medium religiosity’; a value of 4 indicates ‘high religiosity’; and a value of 5
indicates ‘very high religiosity’. We use this second indicator of religiosity mainly
as a control (results for the statistical analyses are reported in the Appendix).
Let us give two examples to clarify our coding procedures. A first example is
indicative of a high degree of explicit religiosity (coded 1 for the first indicator of
explicit religiosity and 5 for the second indicator). In the 1984 abortion debate,
the ‘Association of Pentecostal Free Churches of Switzerland’ (Bund Pfingstlicher
Freikirchen der Schweiz) made the following statement: ‘Both in the Old and the
New Testament, life is under God’s protection. Man is predestined to restore
community with the creator again, via redemption through Jesus Christ. Man is
assigned to serve God with his life. Thus, any measure to shorten or end human
life is not only a violation of the biological order, but also of God’s will’.15
A second example is indicative of a purely secular argumentation of a religious
actor (coded 0 for our first indicator of explicit religiosity and 1 for the second
indicator). In the abortion debate of 2002, the Swiss Catholic Women’s Asso-
ciation (Schweizerischer Katholischer Frauenbund) made the following statement:
‘The decision of a woman/couple in favour or against the child is always a
question of ethics. y As a morally responsible actor, the woman/couple are
responsible to her/their conscience’.16
We analysed about 800 public statements of religious actors in 15 direct
democratic votes in Switzerland in the period from 1970 to 2007. We found very
respectable reliability scores for the two measures of religiosity: the ratios of coder
agreement are 0.74 for the first (and binary) indicator of explicit religiosity and
0.68 for the second indicator.
Predictor variables
For predictor variables, we focus on different issues (abortion vs. immigration),
different media channels (religious vs. secular press), different media genres
(statements, comments, letters to the editor, interviews, political advertisements),
different religious groups [Catholics, Protestants, Christ-Catholics, Free Churches,
Jewish and Muslim communities, non-denominational associations, associations of
14 We have re-checked that all cases that are coded ‘0’ in our first indicator of explicit religiosity are
coded as ‘1’ in the second indicator of explicit religiosity.
15 ‘Im Alten wie im Neuen Testament steht das Leben unter dem go¨ttlichen Schutz. Der Mensch ist
dazu bestimmt, durch die Erlo¨sungstat Jesu Christi die Gemeinschaft mit dem Scho¨pfer wiederzufinden.
Er ist berufen, ihm mit seinem Leben zu dienen. Jeder Eingriff zur Verku¨rzung oder Beendigung des
menschlichen Lebens ist somit nicht nur ein Angriff auf die biologische Ordnung, sondern auch auf den
Heilswillen Gottes’.
16 ‘Der Entscheid einer Frau/eines Paares fu¨r oder gegen das Kind ist letztlich immer eine Frage der
Ethik. y Als moralisch verantwortlich handelnde ist die Frau/das Paar verpflichtet ihrem/seinem
Gewissen zu folgen’.
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religious and non-religious actors, common statements of different religious actors
(non-denominational statements), and common statements of religious and non-
religious actors], internal diversity of religious groups [national leadership organi-
zations, regional leadership organizations, regional and local level associations and
movements, specific actors according to issue (women’s organizations in the case of
abortion and charity organizations in the case of immigration, as well as other
actors including associations of foreigners or actors from the education and uni-
versity spheres), organized vs. private actors, and time period (where we focus on
the different direct democratic votes)]. In addition, we also control for the timing of
the newspaper article [i.e. how many days before or after the vote the text was
published, the length of the article (measured in words)]. Table 1 gives an overview
of the specific codes we used for the predictor as well as for the outcome variables
(explicit religiosity).
Statistical analysis
The statistical analysis is conducted in a Bayesian framework (see e.g. Gelman
et al., 2003; Gill, 2007). For our data, Bayesian inference has several advantages
Table 1. Overview of the dependent and predictor variables
Dependent variables
Explicit religiosity I Dummy variable specifying whether there is a religious
marker in a statement
Explicit religiosity II Indicator measuring the degree of religiosity, ranging from
1 (no religiosity) to 5 (high religiosity)
Predictor variables
Votes Dummy variables for the various direct democratic votes
Media channel Dummy variable for internal press (coded 1) and for secular
press (coded 0)
Media genre Dummy variables for press statement (reference category),
comment, letter to the editor, interview, political ad, other
Religious communities (horizontal
classification)
Dummy variables for Catholics (reference category),
Protestants, Old Catholic Church, Free Churches, Jewish
Communities, Muslim Communities, non-denominational
associations, associations of religious and non-religious
actors, non-denominational statements, and combined
statements of religious and non-religious actors
Religious communities (vertical
classification)
Dummy variables for national leadership (reference
category), regional leadership, regional level, associations,
other actors, and specific actors (women’s organizations
and charity organizations)
Organized actors vs. private actors Dummy variable for religious actors with formal position
(coded 1) and for religious citizens (coded 0)
Timing Days in advance and after vote
Article length Number of words (average number of words per line
multiplied by the number of lines)
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compared with the more widely used frequentist methods (i.e. the so-called
Neyman–Pearson framework). First, Bayesian analysis makes inferences that are
conditional on the actual sample. This is in contrast to frequentist statistics, where
inference is made according to some hypothetical super-population from which
repeated samples akin to the researchers may be drawn. Given the non-random
selection of the units of analysis – the direct democratic votes – we think that
Bayesian inference is more consistent with our data collection process. Second,
several independent variables predict our binary outcome variable (religious vs.
secular argumentation) perfectly, a problem known as perfect separation. In a
frequentist framework, the use of binary choice models such as logit or probit
regression poses severe problems under such conditions: the independent variables
that perfectly predict the outcome are dropped from the statistical analysis.17 This
is problematic since these are, by definition, the strongest predictors, and often the
most interesting phenomena from a theoretical perspective, and should not thus
be excluded simply for technical reasons. By contrast, in a Bayesian framework,
perfect separation poses no problem for binary choice models (such as logistic
regression) since the priors bound the parameters just far enough away from
infinity for them to be identified and estimated.
Although a Bayesian framework encourages the incorporation of substantive
prior knowledge, we refrain from such an undertaking. Since there is very little
knowledge from prior studies available for the subject in hand, we use fairly
conservative and only weakly informative priors on the unknown parameters of
the regression model. More specifically, we follow Gelman et al.’s (2008) advice
and use heavy-tailed Gauchy priors with a centre 0 and 2.5 scale and rescale all
non-binary variables to obtain a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. The
Gauchy prior has good shrinkage properties, which make the estimates slightly
conservative, and allows estimation even under perfect separation. All models are
estimated using the ‘bayesglm’ procedure from the arm (Gelman and Hill, 2007)
package for the R statistical language. An advantage of ‘bayesglm’ is that it does
not rely on Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) approximations for the pos-
terior distribution, using an approximate Expectation Maximization algorithm
instead. Hence, ‘bayesglm’ is a very fast, easy-to-use, and tuning-free algorithm
that frees the user from running the convergence diagnostics required for any
MCMC-based analysis.
To model our binary indicator of explicit religiosity, we use a logistic model; to
model our categorical indicator of explicit religiosity, we use a linear model. The
results presented in the following section are the posterior distributions for the
estimated coefficients for each covariate. Although the dots represent the mean of
the posterior distribution, the short thick lines correspond to the 50% credible
17 Alternatively, pseudo-Bayesian penalization techniques such as those proposed by Firth (1993) can
be employed which – putting philosophical differences aside – are very similar to our full-fledged Bayesian
approach.
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intervals, while the long thin lines correspond to the 95% credible intervals.
Credible intervals are the Bayesian equivalent of confidence intervals in fre-
quentist statistics, but have a simple and intuitive interpretation: the 95% credible
intervals contain the underlying parameter with a posterior probability of 0.95.
To facilitate substantive interpretation, all results are presented in a graphical
manner (numerical estimates are available upon request).18
Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive analyses for our first question, namely how
often religious actors in Switzerland use religious or secular reasons. In addition,
we also take a first stab at addressing issue- and actor-specific differences in the
argumentation modes of religious actors. Table 2 shows that in the abortion
debate, 61% of all statements of religious groups contain a reference to religious
markers, while 39% do not. In the immigration debates, the amount of explicit
religious vocabulary is even lower, hovering at 48%. With regard to the degree of
explicit religiosity, the figures in both abortion and immigration debates indicate a
low degree of religiosity, with mean scores hovering around 2.2 (abortion debates)
and 1.8 (immigration debates). These results are indicative of a predominantly
secular pattern of argumentation, which corresponds to the classic liberal
approach. However, the picture becomes more nuanced when distinguishing
between religious leadership organizations and grassroots organizations. National
and regional leadership organizations (such as the Swiss Conference of Catholic
Bishops) – publicly the most visible religious actors – clearly use more religious
vocabulary than grassroots organizations: in the abortion debates, leadership
organizations use a religious marker in 75% of the cases, whereas the respective
amount in the immigration debates is about 61%. Yet when we focus on the
degree of explicit religiosity, our data show that even religious leadership orga-
nizations (national and regional leadership combined) only very rarely employ a
high degree of explicit religiosity: in the abortion debates, categories 4 and 5
(indicating a high degree of explicit religiosity) are only used in about 11% of the
cases; in the immigration debates, category 4 (high religiosity) is only used in
about 3% of the cases (while we find no instances of category 5 (very high
religiosity). Thus, the strong secular frame of argumentation does not wither
away when taking religious leadership into account. Besides, we find that there
are also differences in argumentative patterns among religious groups. In the
abortion debates, Catholics have the lowest score of religiosity while Free
18 One may wonder why we did not apply a multilevel statistical approach for the data analysis. We
decided against a multilevel approach for the following reasons: on the one hand, there are a high number of
potential levels of analysis (issues, groups, media type). On the other hand, we are also confronted with very
few cases at the higher levels of analysis as well as with a high degree of cross-classification (i.e. the same
actors make statements in multiple non-nested media and issue contexts). This makes it exceedingly difficult
to obtain reliable estimates in a multilevel analysis (especially in the context of binary logistic analyses).
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Churches have the highest score. In the immigration debates, there are similar
differences among the different religious groups, albeit less pronounced than in
the abortion debates. Let us now turn to the multivariate analyses, exploring the
effects of the various context-specific, actor-centric, and time-specific antecedents
of religious actors’ public discourses.
The statistical analyses controlling for covariates largely corroborate the above
findings. The first model (see Figure 1) compares the different issues, namely abortion
vs. immigration for our first (binary) indicator of explicit religiosity. In accordance
with our theoretical expectation, abortion debates entail a higher level of religious
argumentation than immigration debates. This effect is statistically significant (i.e. the
95% credible interval does not include zero). In this statistical model, however, we do
not interpret the effects of the other context and actor-related variables, since these
may play out differently according to the different issues (see analyses below).
Focusing on the separate analysis for abortion (see Figure 2), we see that both
context and actor characteristics matter for explicit religiosity. First, different
media channels and media genres matter: as expected, explicit religiosity is higher
in the religious press than in the secular press. Second, religious groups use less
Table 2. Explicit religiosity in abortion debates
Abortion
All
religious
actors
Catholic
Church
Protestant
Church
Free
Churches
Leadership
organizations (national
and regional)
Explicit religiosity I
No (%) 38.8 40.8 30.0 16.1 25.0
Yes (%) 61.1 59.2 70.0 83.9 75.0
Explicit religiosity II
Mean scores [1 (no religiosity)
to 5 (high religiosity)]
2.21 2.16 2.25 2.77 2.39
N5 284 (all religious actors).
Table 3. Explicit religiosity in immigration debates
Immigration
All
religious
actors
Catholic
Church
Protestant
Church
Free
Churches
Leadership
organizations (national
and regional)
Explicit religiosity I
No (%) 51.7 54.1 33.7 42.9 39.1
Yes (%) 48.3 45.9 66.3 57.1 60.9
Explicit religiosity II
Mean scores [1 (no religiosity)
to 5 (high religiosity)]
1.84 1.81 2.12 2.21 2.00
N5 373 (all religious actors).
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religious argumentation in the mediated channel of press statements (serving as
the reference category) than in unmediated channels such as political advertise-
ments; however, there is no statistically discernable effect for letters to editors
(which also represent a less-mediated communication channel). Third, religious
traditions matter. As expected, the Catholic Church (forming the reference cate-
gory in the analysis19) uses religious vocabulary less frequently than Protestants,
Free Churches, and Jewish and Muslim communities. As we argued before, the
Catholic Church has a natural rights discourse, which eases the secular translation
of religious arguments. Conversely, other religious groups – Protestants, Jews,
Muslims, and especially Free Churches are strongly anchored in their theological
traditions, leading them to use religious reasons more frequently. However, our two
indicators of explicit religiosity do not yield the same results here. Although the first
indicator of religiosity displays a statistically discernible difference between Catholics
and Protestants, the second indicator does not (see Figure A2 in the Appendix).
Religiosity
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Figure 1 Predicting explicit religiosity in abortion and immigration debates (N5 657).
19 For non-technical readers, the reference categories (such as Catholics) are not displayed in the
graphs. The effects displayed in the graphs are the differences of the other categories to the reference
category.
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Yet, both indicators of explicit religiosity show that there is a clear difference
between the Catholic Church and Free Churches. In addition, when religious
actors align with secular actors, explicit religiosity decreases; conversely, when
religious actors act together (in a common organization or common statement),
there is a slight tendency for explicit religiosity to increase (however, the 95%
credible interval does not fully exclude zero20). Third, the internal diversity of
religious groups matters as well: in line with our expectations, more secular-
oriented associations, movements and women’s associations use less religious
vocabulary than the national leadership organizations of religious groups. This
effect is statistically significant (i.e. the 95% credible interval does not include
zero). Moreover, we find a higher amount of religious argumentation for organized
religious actors compared with private ones. Fourth, when focusing on the effects of
the different votes from 1970 to 2002, we detect a slight trend in the direction of
more secular argumentation. This effect is not, however, fully within the 95%
credible interval. Finally, the two control variables yield mixed results: while article
Religiosity
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Figure 2 Predicting explicit religiosity in abortion debates (N5 284).
20 Focusing on the degree of explicit religiosity, we even find a positive and statistically significant
effect for common organizations and statements of religious actors (see figure A2 in the Appendix).
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length is positively associated with explicit religiosity, there is no discernible effect
for the timing of the newspaper article [i.e. how many days the text was published
before (or after) the vote].
The immigration debates display a slightly different pattern of religious argu-
mentation (see Figure 3). First, a number of contextual and actor-centric factors
yield different effects compared with the abortion debates. First, different media
channels (religious vs. secular press) do not really matter in the context of immi-
gration debates: compared with the abortion debates there is even a slight reverse
trend with explicit religiosity scoring higher in the secular press as compared with
the internal press. Since the credible interval does not exclude zero, we do not
strongly interpret this finding. Furthermore, different media genres do not matter:
there are no statistically significant differences between press statements (serving as
the reference category) and other media genres (note that there are no political
advertisements by religious actors in the immigration debates). Second, when
focusing on our first indicator of explicit religiosity (see Figure 3) religious tradi-
tions barely matter. There are few differences among the different religious groups;
an exception here are the Protestants who use more religious vocabulary than the
Catholics (forming the reference category in the analysis). However, when focusing
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Figure 3 Predicting explicit religiosity in immigration debates (N5 373).
124 A N D R E´ B A¨ C H T I G E R E T A L .
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000057
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:28:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
on our second indicator of explicit religiosity (see Figure A3 in the Appendix), there
are no discernible differences among the various religious groups. Furthermore,
when religious actors align with secular actors, there is a slight tendency for explicit
religiosity to decrease; conversely, when religious actors act together (in a common
organization or statement), there is a slight tendency for explicit religiosity to
increase for the second indicator of explicit religiosity. This conforms to the pattern
that we found in the abortion debates. Third, the internal diversity of religious
groups matters as well: more secular-oriented associations, movements and charity
associations use less religious vocabulary than the national leadership organizations
of religious groups. This effect is statistically significant (i.e. the 95% credible
interval does not include zero). Moreover – and in line with the results on abortion –
we find a higher amount of religious argumentation for organized religious actors as
compared with private ones. Fifth, time does not matter for variation in religious
argumentation. There is no discernible trend for the different votes from 1970
to 2006. This is surprising since the different votes also entail different political
constellations (left-wing vs. right-wing actors and radical right vs. all other actors).
We may interpret this result as an effect of routinized behaviour. Regular cam-
paigners in direct democracy (including religious actors) learn how to use a well-
defined set of communication routines that have been established over the course of
time. Kriesi et al. (2009) call this the ‘communication repertoire’ of actors. Thus,
argumentative variation can be constrained. Finally, the two control variables yield
mixed results: while article length is positively associated with explicit religiosity, the
timing of the newspaper article does not yield any discernible effect.
Overall, our findings reveal an interesting gap: on the one hand, many political
philosophers and religious thinkers have moved to a post-classical liberal position
where religious actors can – and even should – openly employ religious arguments
and do not have to translate their deepest beliefs and motivations into some
putatively universal neutral secular language. On the other hand, as the Swiss case
reveals, the practice of religious groups and actors is different. As our descriptive
analyses document, the larger denominations of Catholics and Protestants
especially have a tendency to use a large amount of secular vocabulary. We
think that this documents their adaptation to the generally secular society in
Switzerland. Furthermore, the results of our multivariate analyses also reveal that
the use of religious or secular reasons varies considerably according to different
issues, different arenas (religious vs. secular press), different religious traditions,
different alliance structures, and different media genres, while there is no clear
time trend. As such, it is wrong to see religious vs. secular argumentation as a
uniform phenomenon.
Conclusion
Although the use of religious and secular reason represents a major topic in
political philosophy, no systematic empirical analyses have been conducted on this
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topic. Focusing on direct democratic votes in Switzerland on abortion and
immigration (1970–2006), we detect some intriguing patterns of argumentation.
First, religious actors in the Swiss context use far less religious arguments than one
might commonly surmise. When going public, religious actors largely abide by the
secular norms of public discourse. From a classic liberal perspective, these results
are highly satisfying: most religious groups – especially the larger denominations
of Catholics and Protestants – make a serious translation effort. In the case of
immigration debates, the majority of religious groups’ statements are made in
purely secular terms. Even though our empirical approach does not address the
issue of secular motivation, we may still say that from the perspective of rhetorics
and framing, the larger denominations speak with a fairly liberal voice. From a
post-liberal and communitarian perspective, these results are more problematic:
by abiding by the secular norms of public discourse, religious actors may partly
miss their deliberative role in the public sphere (see Carter, 1993). According
to this perspective, religious groups should not only be allowed to bring their
religiosity into the public discourse but even make a dedicated effort to do so. To
be sure, one can argue that by ‘going public’, religious actors (and especially their
leadership organizations) almost automatically bring their religiosity into public
discourse. From a communitarian perspective, however, the fact that religious actors
frequently abstain from using any religious vocabulary mutilates this role and turns
religious actors into just another civic or political actor. Second, our study also shows
that there is considerable variation in the argumentative strategies of religious groups.
Specific context and actor characteristics affect the way in which religious actors
argue in public sphere. Issue type, religious traditions, alliance structures, and internal
diversity in particular turn out to be strong drivers of different argumentation
patterns (religious vs. secular reasoning). Third, a surprising result of this study is
that time matters little: while we detected a slight trend towards more secular
argumentation in the context of the abortion debates, there is no general time trend
towards a more secular discourse. In other words, even though society has changed,
the public discourse of religious groups has not changed (much).
Of course, our study is not without limitations. First, future research will need
to look beyond the specifics of the Swiss case and engage in comparative analysis.
A comparison with a less secular society such as the United States in particular
might yield interesting results. Second, we also need to shed light on the question
of how citizens – religious as well as secular – evaluate the going public of reli-
gious groups. Do they accept it when religious groups follow the current trend in
political philosophy and use more religious vocabulary in the public sphere? Or
do they oppose this trend and expect religious groups to act like any other civic
actor when going public? Survey results from the European Values Study
(2005–2007) show that about two-thirds of citizens interviewed in Europe are
opposed to a strong influence of religious leaders in public affairs. Thus, religious
actors going public might be well advised to retain their fairly liberal mode of
argumentation in the public sphere. Put differently, one may even argue that the
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use of secular reasons may be a smart strategy employed by religious actors to
advance their causes under largely secular conditions. Third, future research will
also need to look beyond religious vs. secular argumentation. Cristina Lafont
(2007), for instance, proposes a deliberative approach to religion in the public
sphere whereby the key is ‘inclusive accountability’. In this conception, religious
citizens must not abstain from using religious arguments. Their only obligation is
to present persuasive reasons as to why secular counter-arguments are wrong. At
the same time, Lafont’s deliberative approach also requires that religious citizens
must grapple with secular arguments in order to identify generally acceptable
reasons for political decisions with which all citizens must comply (Lafont, 2007).
These limitations notwithstanding, our empirical study on the argumentation
modes of religious actors in the context of Swiss direct democratic votes breaks
new ground on a topic that has been primarily studied from a normative angle.
It shows that a systematic engagement between empirical and normative studies
can yield results that raise further questions for philosophers and religious actors
(and campaigners) alike. We think that our findings should induce reflection both
among philosophers and religious actors about how the argumentation modes of
religious actors should look – and how they can look like under the constraints of
real-world politics such as direct democratic campaigns. Both camps may need to
re-think how a deliberative role of religious groups in the communitarian sense
can be aligned with the necessities of strategic framing in political campaigning.
Such thinking becomes even more important when we consider the growing
numbers of contentious religious issues in current politics. In Switzerland, the
much talked of vote on minarets in 2009 might provide a prominent example in
this regard. Such contentious religious issues press religious actors to define
appropriate political roles as well as appropriate rhetorical strategies.
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Figure A1 Predicting explicit religiosity II (degree of religiosity) in abortion and immigration
debates (N5 657).
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Figure A2 Predicting explicit religiosity II (degree of religiosity) in abortion debates
(N5 284).
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